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Until the end of the 1980s development economists showed little interest in the 
problems of civil war. Yet within the past decade this has changed dramatically, with a 
rapidly expanding literature on the economics or political economy of conflict, civil war, or 
so-called complex humanitarian emergencies. Major research programmes have included: 
UNRISD’s War-Torn Societies Project (www.unrisd.org/wsp); Queen Elizabeth House at 
Oxford (Stewart et al, 1997); a WIDER project on complex humanitarian emergencies (e.g. 
Nafziger and Auvinen, 1997); the ILO (e.g. Cramer and Weeks, 1997); the World Bank (e.g. 
Colleta et al, 1996), which in mid-1999 signalled its commitment by opening a dedicated 
web-site (www.worldbank.org/research/conflict); and the OECD (OECD, 1997). There have 
also been useful surveys of aspects of the literature, including Carbonnier (1998) and 
Luckham et al (1999).  
 
This is not just an academic response to empirical developments, since outbreaks of 
armed conflict of various kinds have long been a common feature of developing countries. 
Two plausible, and probably only partial, explanations may be as follows. Firstly, until the 
end of the Cold War many economists considered war to be purely exogenous, a given of 
global politics, something that occasionally disrupts from time to time more normal 
conditions under which economic laws apply (Fischer and Schwartz, 1992, 239). However, 
wars have proliferated after the Cold War and this has encouraged or freed up economists to 
consider more intimate relations between such conflicts and other variables within their 
models. Secondly, this has coincided with a growing confidence within the mainstream 
economics profession that the precepts of economic orthodoxy can be applied to an 
increasingly wide range of social phenomena. This theme is taken up further in the section 
below on the causes of conflict. 
 
Whatever the actual mix of reasons, there has been something of a shift within the 
economics of conflict in developing countries and specifically in Africa. The interest of 
development economists was at first, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, concentrated on the 
costs of war (UNICEF, 1989; Green, 1991; Stewart, 1993; and more recently Stewart et al, 
1997; Bruck, 1997). During the 1990s, however, there has been increasing economic analysis 
of the dynamics of wartime (Azam et al, 1994; Chingono, 1995) and, even more, of the 
economic or political economy origins of conflict (e.g. Nafziger et al, 1999; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 1996; UNRISD, 1999). Throughout, there has been an interest in the post-conflict 
role of economics. Post-war rehabilitation analyses can draw on cost-of-war exercises and 
also on analyses of the causes of war and of wartime economic and social change (e.g. Boyce 
et al, 1997). Despite the expansion of the literature on these subjects, there remain areas of 
significant analytical and empirical weakness, and the subject, as part of development 
economics, is still in its infancy.  
 
As well as a shift from focusing on the consequences of conflicts towards analysing 
their “root causes”, the shift in perspective within the economics of war in poor countries has 
taken other forms. From treating these conflicts as exogenous events, whose economic effects 
are then traced through the mechanisms of economic models, economists have increasingly 
brought the determination of conflicts within the interaction of model variables. At the same 
time, there has been something of a shift in intellectual confidence as development 
economists have taken more eagerly to analysing wars. Early exercises might have spoken of 
the “vacuum” in the political economy of war (Green, 1991) or might have asked modestly 
whether economic analysis can help to mitigate the costs of conflict (Stewart, 1993). More 
recently, this tone has shifted to incorporate a more assertive sense that economics is the best-
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placed discipline for understanding the origins, dynamics and consequences of conflicts in 
poor countries.  
 
After briefly reviewing the spread of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
emphasising their diversity, this paper focuses chiefly on the literature on the costs of conflict 
and on the causes of conflict. The main argument of the paper is that conflict directly 
expresses social, political and economic relations and that therefore it requires analytical tools 
directly geared towards understanding relations. However, the majority of the literature only 
addresses conflict via concepts with an indirect grasp of relations at best. So, the majority of 
the literature is dominated either by structuralist explanations and concepts of stratification 
(such as ethnicity, income inequality, poverty) or by the non-relational methodological 
individualism of neo-classical economics. The two are sometimes combined, for example in 
the expanding amount of cross-sectional large sample statistical or econometric analysis. This 
methodological distinction is yet to be adequately highlighted and explored in the literature. 
Research into direct social relations in individual contexts, and their expression through 
armed conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, has so far chiefly been confined to case-study material 
of considerable value. 
 
The literature on conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world has also 
become a site of reductionist colonisation by mainstream economics. The paper discusses 
this, for example, in the light of implicit theories of violence and war assumed by much of the 
literature. The two most commonly accepted theories are: that violence and conflict are 
functions of scarcity and that conflict is a function of difference, expressed through measures 
of inequality or ethnic fragmentation, for example. This paper suggests that, at least, more 
subtle discussion of underlying theories of violence needs to be made explicit, and introduces 
one theory of human violence with suggestive links to the problems of late capitalist 
development. The paper also seeks to escape the constraints of the classical liberal 
interpretation of war, that it is exclusively and always negative in its consequences; instead, 
economists should be prepared to explore the conditions under which conflicts, however 
terrible and destructive, can also play more constructive roles. 
 
 
2.     The prevalence of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 If we take a major armed conflict to be one in which at least 5,000 people died, then 
at a rough estimate there have been some 27 major armed conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa 
during the past two decades. Some 17 of these countries have had earlier major conflicts this 
century too and some eight of the conflicts very obviously have roots going back before 
independence. Another nine or so countries have experienced conflicts in the past twenty 
years or so that have had fewer casualties. Conflicts have been especially frequent perhaps 
during the 1990s. By another measure, in which an armed conflict is defined as a war when 
more than 1,000 people die per year (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1998), between 1989 and 
1997 there were fourteen wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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War Casualties in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries 
 
 1900-1970 1970-80 1980-90 1990- 
Angola 1961-75                               1976-95 1998- 
Burundi  1972  1988-95  
Cameroon 1955-60    
CAR    1996-7 
Chad   1980-94  
DR Congo 1960-65   1993 & 1996 
Congo    1993- 
Djibouti    1990-96 
Eritrea  1974-91  1998- 
Ethiopia 1935   1941 1974-79,       1976-83  1998- 
Guinea Bissau 1962-74   1998- 
Kenya 1954-56   1991-96 
Liberia   1985-88 1990-97 
Madagascar 1947-48    
Mali   1988-94  
Mozambique 1965-75 1976-92  
Niger    1991-96 
Nigeria 1967-70  1980, 1984 1991 
Rwanda 1956-65   1990-97 
Senegal   1982  
Sierra Leone    1991 
Somalia    1988-95  
Sudan 1963-72  1983- 
South Africa 1899-06 1976 1983-94  
Uganda 1966 1970-78 1980-87 1992- 
Zambia 1964    
Zimbabwe  1972-79 1983-84  
 
Togo, Ghana, Gabon, Comoros, Lesotho, Mauritania, Namibia, Western Sahara and Zambia 
have all experienced minor conflicts with less than 5,000 casualties since independence. 
 
Source: Luckham et al (1999). 
 
Legend: 






For the most part, these conflicts are what is normally defined as “internal” wars, i.e. 
not wars between countries, with the exceptions including recent conflict between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. However, in virtually every one of these wars there has been external involvement 
of one kind or another, ranging from huge international support on either side of the MPLA-
UNITA conflict in Angola to French military and political support for the Habyarimana 
regime in Rwanda during the war against the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces, 
in the build-up to the genocide of 1994. Other wars have had foreign involvement of a more 
private, commercial nature, including the contribution of multinationals to political and 
military feuding in, for example, Sierra Leone and Liberia (Reno, 1998). Traditional notions 
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of a “civil war” are less relevant in a world where the ways that wars are fought reflect 
international economic integration. International arms markets, the use of external debt or 
foreign exchange, especially mineral based, to purchase arms, the integration of cross-border 
weapons and criminal networks, foreign military “aid”, are all characteristic of many modern 
“civil” wars. Furthermore, these wars commonly have spillover effects, humanitarian, 
economic, and even military: thus, countries like Tanzania or Cote d’Ivoire have been 
affected by war in surrounding countries. 
 
Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa during the past two decades reflect widespread concerns 
that the nature of typical armed conflicts has changed (de Waal, 1997). These wars generate 
huge numbers of civilian casualties rather than being confined to traditional battles between 
well-defined armies. Clear-cut distinctions between military forces and civilians are often 
missing in these wars, in which, sometimes, a person may slide between civilian behaviour 
and militia activity or in which, as in Sierra Leone (Richards, 1996) there are so-called 
“sobels”, government soldiers by day, rebels by night. 
 
One of the major difficulties that compromises the precision of economic analysis – 
particularly at the level of cross-country comparisons – is that of defining wars. There are two 
main parts to this difficulty. One is that it is often hard accurately to distinguish the 
beginning, and indeed sometimes the end also, of a period to be defined as a war. The other is 
that all wars are not alike. This goes for their causes, and it goes too for their intensity, their 
geographical spread, their duration, their military characteristics, etc.2 Indeed, in the growing 
literature there are differing definitions of what constitutes a war for the purposes of empirical 
analysis. In a country like Angola, warfare is written into the whole fabric of social relations 
and the majority of the population have lived their whole lives in a context of war; in others, 
such as Sudan, war has also been protracted, but it has arguably been more intermittent and 
more geographically concentrated, though its economic, political and social effects are 
widespread if not always so direct. In still others, such as Burundi or Nigeria, armed conflict 
has been more brief. Yet these examples reveal another problem for analysis, in that the 
distinction between war and other forms of violence or other forms of social conflict are not 
always hard and fast. One example might be South Africa. There was a form of civil war that 
principally affected what is now KwaZulu/Natal Province and that had a satellite conflict in 
the townships of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) industrial heartland. 
However, in another sense, South Africa could be described as a war economy for a much 
longer period, given the political conflict over the apartheid system, a prolonged if not 
immensely effective guerrilla campaign by the armed wing of the ANC (Umkhonto we Sizwe 
– Spear of the Nation), and the substantial military expenditure and efforts to destabilise much 
of the Southern African region by the apartheid regime. Further, to the extent that violence 
and political conflict undermine economic performance by, for example, the disincentive to 
investment, arguably post-apartheid violence has weakened the distinction between war and 
violence.3 
 
The next major problem is the unreliability of data. Socio-economic data for much of 
Sub-Saharan Africa are notoriously unreliable in non-conflict periods. This point can be made 
for various different sectors (see Yeats, 1989, on trade statistics; Riddell, 1990, on 
manufacturing data; de Haan and Koch, 1997, on labour market data; and Svedberg, 1990, on 
                                                          
2 Stewart (1998, 2) argues that there can be no simple generalisations and it should no longer be 
possible “to state – as many do – that conflict is inevitable because of primordial ethnic divisions, nor 
that it is the outcome of underdevelopment and that policies to combat low incomes and poverty will 
also automatically reduce the risk of conflict”.  
3 Violent crime cannot always be clearly distinguished from political violence either, as, again, in the 
case of South Africa and the involvement of political groups in apparently “criminal” violence (Ellis, 
1999). On the other hand, some forms of investment may be relatively immune to political violence, as 
in the oil sector in Angola (see also, on Nigeria, Frynas, 1998).  
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nutrition and agricultural data). War exacerbates this problem in a variety of ways. Even if 
data collection agencies remain well-staffed, the collection of data in many areas can become 
to perilous. It is likely that there is a significant increase in most internal wars in the degree to 
which economic activity is unenumerated, partly because enumeration efforts decline and 
partly because normal marketing channels either break down or are evaded. This can make it 
difficult, for example, to quantify with any confidence the effect of conflict on agricultural 
output (Cramer and Weeks, forthcoming). Brown et al (1992) suggest that in the Horn of 
Africa, for example, the share of subsistence agriculture in total output has increased during 
war, and growing informal or underground activities have pushed much economic activity 
outside the coverage of national accounts. Furthermore, it is difficult at times to know when 
to attribute observed outcomes in the form of economic data to war or to other, separate or 
inter-related developments. That unreliable data weaken the economic analysis of war-
affected countries is widely acknowledged. Nonetheless, this has not stopped many observers 
attempting to quantify the costs of conflict or to pull confident analytical inferences out of 
cross-country statistical analysis of war economies. At the case-study level, a good example is 
the international response to conflict and genocide in Rwanda. In the immediate aftermath of 
the genocide sweeping and misleading judgements were made about the imminence of famine 
and the impact of conflict on the country’s seed stock. These estimates were generated partly 
by external assumptions and partly by the new government in Rwanda, most of whose 




3.    Mortgag’d States, Wasted Nations4 - assessing the costs of conflict 
  
 This section first highlights in broad brushstrokes the developmental impact of 
internally fought wars in Africa, then discusses formal analytical and quantitative models of 
the economic impact of war, and lastly focuses on a number of problematic issues opened up 
by the recent literature. The discussion highlights the role in recent literature played by 
applying Sen’s entitlements approach and draws attention to the influence of the classical 
liberal interpretation of the economic impact of war, i.e. the idea that war is exclusively a loss 
in economic terms.  
 
3.1 Pervasive effects 
The economic effects of wars in Africa are felt throughout society; the costs are 
particularly high as a result of wars being internally fought and because of their integration 
into international economic (and political) relations. Resources are at least potentially 
diverted from social and economic investment and recurrent spending towards the war effort.5 
Wars are frequently financed by inflation, since in a civil war in a low-income country the 
scope for paying for a war out of increased wartime production and employment (à la 
Keynes’s How to Pay for the War) are negligible. Productive investment is deflected by 
wartime conditions (Azam et al, 1994). Wartime insecurity reduces competition and, for 
example in trading, creates monopoly rents or a war tax with negative consequences for 
consumers.6 The trading infrastructure is commonly disrupted partly by direct damage to 
roads, bridges, irrigation networks and power lines, and partly by the diversion of vehicles to 
the military.  
                                                          
4 See Samuel Johnson’s imitation of Juvenal’s tenth Satire:  
“Yet Reason frowns on War’s unequal Game, 
Where Wasted Nations raise a single Name, 
And mortag’d States their Grandsires’ Wreaths regret, 
From Age to Age in everlasting Debt” 
(in Milward, 1984, 10).  
5 Stewart (1993) makes it clear that such “meso-level” spending diversions are not always evident: e.g. 
in some countries health spending is stable or rises while military expenditure increases sharply. 
6 On the war tax in Mozambique, see, e.g., Castel-Branco and Cramer (forthcoming). 
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Agricultural production is affected in a number of ways: marketed output is typically 
reduced by the impossibility or soaring cost of transport; foreign exchange shortage and 
military absorption reduce the availability of agricultural marketed inputs; migrant labour 
sources dry up; the agricultural labour force shrinks thanks to casualties, flight and military 
recruitment; fighting and the sowing of landmines has a direct effect on cultivation. In 
Rwanda, for example, a “year’s tea and coffee harvests had been lost, and vandals had left all 
the tea factories and about seventy percent of the country’s coffee-depulping machines 
inoperable” (Gourevitch, 1999, 229). Over 28 years, 1970-97, conflict-related losses to 
agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa amounted to a total of some $52bn (in 1995 
dollars), according to one estimate (Cramer and Weeks, forthcoming). This represented some 
30 per cent of the agricultural output of affected countries during conflict years. In extreme 
cases such as Angola, with virtually continuous warfare since before 1970, empirical 
estimates suggest that agricultural output at the end of the 1990s was well below half what it 
would have been in the absence of war. Other countries with conflict effects on agricultural 
production almost as severe were Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan.  
 
According to a World Bank report: “In Central and Eastern Africa alone, about 22 
million people are displaced…Natural disasters and famine used to be the root of human 
suffering and displacement in Africa; now, internal conflict is the leading cause of 
emergencies in many countries” (World Bank, 1996, p.v). The effects of conflict on the poor 
are potentially considerable. For Messer et al (1998, 1), armed conflicts constitute a 
significant cause of deteriorating food scenarios in developing countries. Luckham et al 
(1999, 4) argue more forthrightly that armed conflict has “become the single most important 
determinant of poverty in Africa”.  
 
3.2 Modelling the costs of conflict 
A number of sectoral, macroeconomic, and comprehensive economic analyses 
(drawing, for example, on Sen’s entitlements approach) have attempted to formalise and 
quantify the economic costs of war in Africa and elsewhere. Many of these share a distinction 
between direct war damage and indirect developmental costs of war, including an argument 
(Stewart, 1993) that the indirect costs are larger and longer-lasting than the direct costs. These 
exercises in assessing the costs of war began with efforts by SADCC (1986), UNICEF 
(1989), and Green (1991) to establish the developmental effects of war in Africa, particularly 
focusing on Southern Africa and the effects of the South African apartheid regime’s 
destabilising activities in the region. UNICEF (1989), for example, argued that the cost of 
destabilisation in Angola and Mozambique between 1980 and 1988 amounted to close to 
$47bn while losses for the remaining seven (at the time) SADCC member states amounted to 
about $17bn, though these figures were based on somewhat nonchalant counterfactuals.  
 
During the 1990s Stewart (starting with Stewart, 1993) has been at the forefront of 
formalising this analytical framework. Stewart et al (1997) analyse a sample of 16 countries 
in which more than 0.5 per cent of the population died due to direct and indirect war effects 
during the 1970s and 1980s: of these, <> were in Sub-Saharan Africa. Broadly, the findings 
of this analysis are: 
 
• That indirect effects have more significant long-run developmental effects than 
immediate, direct effects. For example, social, cultural and institutional degeneration have 
consequences for economic production and transactions and generate lasting negative 
multiplier effects on investment; 
• That war costs are more severe where conflict is geographically pervasive and where state 
collapse is manifest in the loss of core revenue collecting and public good provision 
capacities; 
• That international wars are less harmful than civil wars; 
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• That the considerable variations in the economic consequences of war that are observed 
may be affected by variations in the duration, intensity and geographical spread of 
conflict, whether or not international trade embargoes are imposed, public sector collapse, 
and the availability or otherwise of non-state social support networks; 
• That the costs of war also are affected by pre-war features of the economic structure, 
including the import dependence ratio, the level of subsistence production and the 
incidence of poverty. 
 
The methodology adopted in Stewart et al (1997) is to compare social and economic 
performance indicators in conflict-affected countries with both the pre-war period and with 
non-conflict countries in the same region as conflict-affected countries; and to combine this 
empirical analysis with an application of Sen’s entitlements conceptual framework to guide a 
disaggregated assessment of which groups are affected in different ways by the effects of 
war.7 The original idea of entitlements based in legal production and market exchange is 
broadened to consider public entitlements, civil entitlements and non-legal acquisition or loss 
of assets and income during war. Luckham et al (1999) offer a matrix of the mechanisms 
through which wars affect economies and societies, distinguishing between entitlements 
versus needs, and direct and indirect (macro, meso and micro level) channels. Within this 
framework, it is then possible to consider the macro and disaggregated effects of, for 
example, the tendency in wartime to shift economic activities towards more short-term and 
consumption based types (Collier and Gunning, 1995; Bruck, ; Addison, 1998) as well as to 
trace through the impact of conflict on health and education service delivery, market 
segmentation and regional price differentials and the disruption of rural livelihoods.  
 
Besides these approaches there have been formal attempts to model the impact of war on 
food production and total agricultural output. Messer et al (1998, 16-21) conduct with-without 
investigation of actual and “peace-adjusted” food production in Sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, 
the difference between mean annual food production per capita in war and non-war years is 
calculated, as a percentage of non-war production means. Secondly, the same procedure is 
followed for mean rates of growth of food production. Then, using both the mean production 
and rate of growth approaches, estimates are made of what food output might have been in the 
absence of war and contrasted with actual trends. The findings suggest that in 13 out of 14 
countries food production was lower in war years, with drops ranging from 3.4 per cent in 
Kenya to 44.5 per cent in Angola, around an average annual wartime decline in food 
production of 12.3 per cent. Food production growth rates in the 1970-93 period captured in 
this analysis declined by as little as 0.3 per cent in Chad and as much as 8.1 per cent in 
Liberia, with an average decline of 2.9 per cent. Chad and Uganda present anomalies since 
food production appears to rise during war years in both. 
 
Cramer and Weeks (forthcoming) estimate direct agricultural output losses due to war, 
with no attempt to include capital losses or indirect effects, for major conflict-affected 
regions. This is done by specifying a simple model in which the level of agricultural output in 
the absence of war is determined by relative prices and a trend variable capturing, 
respectively, short-run farmer decisions and the growth of the labour force together with 
technical change. Conflict losses are then estimated by including a dummy variable taking the 
value of one in conflict years. This model generates, as mentioned above, an estimate of total 
agricultural loss due to war in the 1970-97 period, in Sub-Saharan Africa, of $52bn in 1995 
dollars. Both the level and trend of estimated losses rose after the early 1980s, despite the 
return to peace in the early 1990s of Ethiopia (a qualified peace) and Mozambique. For the 24 
years for which this estimation method and that applied to food production by Messer et al 
(1998) overlap, the food production approach gives an estimated average loss of 2.8 per cent 
of total food production, while Cramer and Weeks estimate losses of an average 4 per cent of 
total agricultural production across all Sub-Saharan African countries. Given the difference 
                                                          
7 For a case-study approach see O’Sullivan (1997) on Sri Lanka. 
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between food and total agricultural production, these two estimates are fairly consistent in the 
overall pattern observed. Both, however, are cautious not to claim more than a very rough 
indication of losses due to conflict in agriculture, thanks to extreme data unreliability, the 
difficulty in separating conflict effects from those of the weather, health trends (e.g. HIV), 
and volatile commodity price trends, and the difficulties of separating the effects of conflict 
on agriculture from the effects of agricultural decline or crisis on the origins of conflict.  
 
Most of the war-costing exercises reviewed above do acknowledge the significance of 
data weaknesses in undermining the accuracy of their estimates. These weaknesses need 
highlighting, not as an aside but as central to the analytical problem. Brown et al (1992, 200) 
point out that “the figures we usually use in analysing and measuring the severity of the 
crisis…are so hopelessly inadequate that they cannot provide a full account of the actual 
situation and in some cases give a totally wrong impression”. Indeed, the most sensible 
approach is that taken by Luckham et al (1999), who suggest that they do not intend “to 
portray what we know already, which is far too little, but to highlight some of the 




3.3 Critical concerns about war-costing 
It seems reasonable to expect a growth industry in research attempting to fill out with 
greater and more disaggregated empirical detail the analytical framework developed in these 
war-costing exercises. But there remain some significant analytical question marks over this 
approach. One way to explore a more critical perspective on cost-of-war assessments is to 
recollect the history of their precursors in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These 
earlier war-costing exercises have been characterised as the classical liberal interpretation of 
war (Milward, 1984) as exclusively negative in its social and economic consequences: “Since 
war was a loss, the best way its effects on the economy could be finally expressed was to 
calculate that loss as accurately as possible” (ibid., 11). However, these analyses came under 
a sharp critical spotlight. Wherever any lingering assumption of full employment is dropped, 
it is very difficult to assess the economic loss of an individual war casualty. The effect of war 
on growth is complicated further by the reality of changing technology during a war, as well 
as changing institutions and shifting social relations. Both direct and indirect costs proved, for 
example during the First World War, exceedingly difficult to measure –in terms of human and 
other forms of capital. Increasingly, it became clear that the social and institutional changes 
wrought during war weakened the depiction of war as simply a loss. And there was evidence 
that some part at least of the extra expenditure (and the diversion of expenditure) on the war 
effort could be beneficial in generating income by stimulating new employment and 
production. One example was agriculture in Britain during the First World War, in which 
both farmers and farm labourers – though the former to a greater degree – benefited from 
wartime price guarantees and other interventions designed to reverse the previous decline in 
the role of agriculture in the British economy.  
 
Present day poor countries fighting civil or internal wars are not the same as industrialised 
countries fighting international conflicts. Expenditures are diverted to war, war is typically 
financed by borrowing and by inflation, but there is less productive effort geared to the war – 
in terms of provisioning the military or replacing imported food by domestically produced 
food. The differences are greater where internal conflict takes place in a context of state 
collapse, as for example in Somalia; though further research would be needed to assess the 
organisation of production in Somaliland. The import and foreign aid dependence of the 
economy are likely to rise in developing countries at war. Therefore, there are some grounds 
for thinking that the classical liberal interpretation of the economic impact of war is more 
appropriate in these wars.  
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However, firstly, there remain the difficulties of quantifying accurately the costs of 
conflict – because of the complications of assuming average life expectancies reflecting the 
social composition of war casualties, because of difficulties in measuring unemployment 
and/or underemployment in poor countries, because of straightforward data lacunae, etc. 
Secondly, at this stage extremely little research has actually been done on some aspects of the 
economics of war in LDCs. There is little empirical detail on the role of war in stimulating 
production increases and changes in the technology and/or organisation of production in some 
sectors of LDCs. Indeed, even in a civil war certain rural areas, with military protection, may 
undergo productive stimulus just as others fall idle (this goes for areas under control of both 
sides). And there is little knowledge about the role of war in the emergence of a national 
capitalist class. Thirdly, little is known about how civil wars affect social relations. This effect 
is of course variable, within two extremes: one characterised by Sorokin’s idea that disaster, 
including war, was a favourable ground “for the emergence of radically different social 
forms” (1942, 120, cited in Milward, 1984, 44); and the other by the impulse to a “return to 
normalcy” (Form and Loomis, 1956, in Milward, 1984, 44). The former effect is commonly 
associated with the experience of conflict and post-conflict change in, for example, South 
Korea. The latter is more in line with the assumption in much of the recent literature on 
conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa that conflict becomes central to socio-economic path 
dependence, and hence the inclusion of “history of conflict” variables in some models (e.g. 
Nafziger and Auvinen, 1997; Collier and Hoeffler, 1996). Fourthly, what is the appropriate 
counterfactual non-conflict scenario against which war losses are to be measured? For 
example, it might not always be clear that economic losses due to war are more than in the 
absence of a war where there may yet be militarisation of the society and economy. And what 
presumptions can be made about the direction and effectiveness of policy in the absence of 
war?  
 
The main difficulties in cost-of-war exercises are that they presume implicitly a static 
world in which one can clearly identify benchmarks for measuring loss, and that their 
accounting framework neglects the economic implications of complex shifts in social 
relations during a conflict. There is also a problem with choosing the appropriate time 
dimension for analysis. Despite Stewart’s (1993) suggestion that the long-run costs of conflict 
endure after the end of a war, there is also scope for socio-economic changes during war – 
however unpalatable at the time – to have longer run progressive consequences. An example 
might concern the so-called “war tax”. After a war, when some monopoly trading rent has 
dissipated, wartime speculators and entrepreneurs may provide a source of productive 
investment.8 Evidence suggests, for example, that the post-war national bourgeoisie in 
Mozambique that bought privatised enterprises from the state accumulated by the successful 
exploitation of war-rent (personal interviews). It is also possible that post-conflict 
infrastructure rehabilitation creates a faster and more comprehensive replacement and 
upgrading of infrastructure stock than would have occurred otherwise. Further, the liberal 
interpretation of the economic impact of war implicitly assumes that many war costs derive 
from market distortions. However, here as in other economic areas it is unwise to presume 
that discrepancy from an idealised benchmark of market perfection has exclusively negative 
implications. Amsden (1997) points out that, contrary to the common assumption that 
development is a movement closer and closer towards market perfection, development is 
often driven partly by the construction of market imperfections where these are value-
enhancing and favourable to investment and innovation. Wartime “distortions” in the form of 
a war tax and monopoly rents to entrepreneurs may, within this perspective, be part of a 
process that, if channelled effectively after the end of conflict, contributes to development. 
Therefore, the post-war management of such wartime economic developments becomes 
indistinct from the assessment of the economic effects of war. 
 
                                                          
8 See also Collier and Gunning (1995) on the portfolio preferences of wartime accumulators. 
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Towards the end of the 1990s, the literature on the economic consequences and costs of 
conflict in Africa and elsewhere reflected a shift. On the one hand, some analyses have 
remained under the influence of the basic assumptions of the classical liberal interpretation of 
war. On the other hand, elements of the critique of this interpretation have begun to be 
addressed. The insight that some people do well out of a war has been incorporated into 
analysis of the impact of war. One exploration of this is Collier and Gunning’s (1995) work 
on the portfolio preferences of those with wartime savings and on the post-conflict policy 
options for influencing the re-allocation of such savings towards productive investment in, for 
example, export-oriented manufacturing. Another manifestation of this same observation – 
that there are economic winners as well as losers from internal conflict – is possible through 
the application of an entitlements framework, which allows for exploration of the uneven 
consequences of conflict. This acknowledgement of wartime accumulation has been 
influenced by work on the political economy of “asset transfers” during conflicts and of the 
role of war in creating famines (Duffield, 1991, 1994; de Waal, 1998; Keen, 1995). These 
analyses tend to be focused on case-study analysis rather than large sample cross-country 
statistical analysis. They also tend to prioritise the analysis of context-specific social relations 
and consequently to understand economic developments as embedded in these historically 
shaped social relations, rather than to prioritise economic models whose assumptions and 
methodology ultimately is constructed on neo-classical foundations.  
 
To sum up, there analytical and methodological tensions in the literature on the economic 
consequences of conflict in Africa. Assumptions rooted in the classical liberal interpretation 
of the economic impact of war do not fit comfortably alongside acknowledgement of the 
economic beneficiaries of conflict and the possibility of some long-run positive economic 
change arising from the experience of conflict. Applying the entitlements framework may 
help in that it enables a disaggregation of the economic consequences of conflict (Stewart et 
al, 1997; Luckham et al, 1999). However, the entitlements framework itself is compromised 
by a tension between neo-classical assumptions of methodological individualism and greater 
openness to the primacy of social relations (Fine, 1997).  
 
Tensions could be resolved either by foregoing the political economy approach and 
relying consistently on orthodox assumptions, or by attempting to build on political economy 
approaches and to shed the orthodox methodologies. This latter approach may, for example, 
lead to more research into changes in institutions and in social relations or class formation 
and, for example, to research into the contribution of wartime accumulation to the post-
conflict development of the private sector, including changes in organisation within firms. 
Overall, it would appear that there has been considerable progress during the past decade in 
developing analytical frameworks for the assessment of the economic impact of conflicts. 
Nonetheless, there remains considerable scope for further inquiry, partly to add to the level of 
empirical knowledge about relationships between conflict and economic outcomes and partly 
to refine analytical approaches. While war clearly does affect the economy in many ways, 
understanding the relationship between war and economy becomes even more complex once 
it is acknowledged that both the war and economic developments may be jointly determined 
by other structural, historical and political factors. 
 
 
4.    Theories of violence and the origins of conflict in economics and political 
economy 
 
 In much of the recent literature on war in Africa there is little discussion of 
underlying theories of violence and conflict. This section briefly reviews earlier strands in 
development theory regarding conflict and then locates recent analyses, with their focus on 
scarcity and difference as propagators of conflict, within this theoretical context. It is argued 
that the majority of recent work on the subject is either “structuralist” or is rooted in the 
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individualist, rational choice presumptions of neo-classical economics. Both traditions 
support cross-section, multi-country statistical analysis of conflict and its correlates, in which, 
it is argued, the significance of context and social relations is air-brushed out of the analysis. 
After reviewing briefly some major contributions to this search for empirical regularities, the 
section goes on to discuss the emerging emphasis on the role of economic agendas in the 
origin of conflicts in Africa. Next, there is a discussion of the treatment in the literature of 
major manifestations of difference, i.e. ethnicity and inequality. Following this, the discussion 
opens up some alternative ideas about the origins of violence and conflict, and considers their 




4.1 “Development” and conflict 
Within the broad schools of development theory since the 1950s, there have been a 
number of ideas about the sources of social violence, conflict, or civil war. Although there are 
contrasts between some of these ideas, they mostly share a sense of conflict arising from 
friction in social relations, and of this friction being generated by processes of development, 
snags and contradictions in development, and/or the social upheavals brought about by 
capitalist development. Individual economic motivations – greed for some, survival for others 
– are typically understood within these theories as bound by, embedded in or flowing from 
larger social processes and tensions.  
 
Commentators such as Olson (1963) and Huntington (1968) came to see the process 
of “modernisation” as itself almost inevitably accompanied by conflict, because of the social 
upheavals that development created.9 For example, social grievances arose from the 
disruption to traditional ways of life, disruptions that were characterised, for example, by 
commercialisation of consumption goods and labour. Dependency theorists explained 
conflicts in terms of the arrested development that was imposed on peripheral societies by the 
core capitalist nations, and in terms of the “proxy” conflict between core powers, fought out 
on the terrain of the periphery. Another kind of explanation of conflict was influenced 
particularly by Tilly’s (1975) ideas about the tensions that typically arise from the efforts of 
central authorities to mobilise resources towards the ends of constructing nation-states. If 
there is always a reaction against such mobilisation, whether or not this generates armed 
conflict will depend on the ways in which the central state manages the mobilisation of 
resources (in an exclusive or more reciprocal manner) and the way that it manages the 
reactions provoked.10 Within this framework, the relationship between democratic institutions 
and the propensity for conflict is interesting but never straightforward (c.f. Stewart and 
O’Sullivan, 1997). Finally, “moral economy” analyses of peasant societies disrupted by the 
introduction and spread of capitalism have generated explanations of peasant radicalism, 
some focusing more on the internal factors generating crisis and conflict, others more on 
external provocations (Scott, 1976, 1985; Wolf, 1969; Moore, 1966). Within this framework, 
Wolf (1969), for example, stressed the role of the group economic interests of middle 
peasantries in conflict, since they had most to gain from capturing material benefits 
previously denied them within a particular social structure, but least to lose (compared with 
poorer peasants) from the costs of conflict. 
 
 
4.2 Scarcity, difference and shock 
More recent analyses of conflict in developing countries, including those in Sub-
Saharan Africa, have tended to stress two underlying causes of conflict – scarcity and 
difference – and their combination. Scarcity is revealed either in stagnation and/or poverty, or 
                                                          
9 A lengthier review of the ideas of development theory on conflict is in PRIO (1999).  
10 For an analysis of the origins of war in Angola and Mozambique drawing on this approach, see 
Cramer (1994). 
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in direct resource scarcity, e.g. food production, environmental resource degradation and 
scarcity (Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1998), or water shortages (Starr, 1991). Difference is 
typically analysed through either or both of ethnic (or more broadly identity) difference or 
inequality in the distribution of assets and income. These theories owe much to Gurr’s theory 
of relative deprivation (Carbonnier, 1998). These underlying theories of conflict are 
structuralist, in that they focus only indirectly on relations between groups, via structural 
representations or attributes of differentiation and relative deprivation. These structural 
representations include, for example, use of the Gini coefficient to capture inequality and use 
of an ethno-linguistic index of collective identity fragmentation, cohesion or polarisation. The 
more these structural concepts of the social background to conflict are appealed to, the less 
the real content of specific social relations can be central to the analysis. A consequence is 
that it then becomes easier to lift such concepts as inequality or ethnicity out of their actual 
context, out of “effective reality”, and to append them as capturing the “social” to non-social 
methodologies.  
 
With a picture of susceptibility to conflict, or “latent social cleavages” apparently 
revealed by structural measures, it is then possible to consider the effect on such a system of a 
major change, e.g. an external shock or a shift in policy direction. In the case of Rwanda, for 
example, the most obvious external shock was the collapse of international prices for the main 
export commodities (coffee, tea and tin) during the second half of the 1980s. Rodrik (1998) 
expands on this idea, analysing the differential impact of external shocks on economic growth 
under variable measures of latent social conflict and of institutional capacity for conflict 
management. He finds that external shocks do generate conflict where underlying proclivity 
for conflict is strong at the same time as the institutions of conflict management are weak. 
The model proxies for latent social conflict with measures of inequality, ethnic and linguistic 
fragmentation, and social trust, and for institutional capacity to manage distributional conflict 
by measures of civil liberties and political rights, the quality of government institutions, the 
rule of law, competitiveness of political participation, and public spending on social 
insurance. 
 
Besides external terms of trade or other economic shocks, structurally conflictual 
societies may be thrown into actual conflict by the effects upon the given social structure of 
shifts in policy, such as structural adjustment. There have been various attempts to explore 
whether structural adjustment policies have an in-built tendency to raise the likelihood of 
conflict (Morrison et al, 1994; Nafziger and Auvinen, 1997; Cramer and Weeks, 1998; 
Woodward, 1996; Storey,1999). Their findings vary but it is clear that there is no 
outstandingly clear direct causal effect of structural adjustment leading to conflict. Arguably, 
nonetheless, there are ways in which structural adjustment policies might raise the potential 
for conflict. This could happen if sudden and dramatic effects, including devaluation and 
capital account liberalisation, plunged an already frail society sharply into economic crisis. It 
could also happen if the effects of stabilisation and adjustment included a shift of material 
power between either classes or collective identity groups. Hence, there is a common 
argument that privatisation has the potential to increase political instability by shifting 
resources from a public sector with a particular ethnic character and a private sector 
dominated by a different ethnic mix (Mkandawaire, 1994).  
 
 
4.3 The search for regular patterns across countries 
As we have argued, analytical attempts to capture the propensity to warfare via 
measures of structural attributes and difference in a society lend themselves well to multi-
country statistical comparison. A number of attempts have been made in recent years to find 
regular patterns relating the behaviour of certain variables derived from such measures to 
outcomes of conflict or complex humanitarian emergencies. Some of these are relatively 
eclectic in their modelling approach (e.g. Nafziger and Auvinen, 1997), while others (e.g. 
Collier and Hoeffler, 1996) are built on tighter explanatory models. In a quest for causal 
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uniformity, these exercises deprive their subjects of context. Nonetheless, they have generated 
influential findings, at times at odds with each other. For example, Nafziger and Auvinen 
(1997) focus chiefly on the links between their dependent variables (measures of conflict and 
complex humanitarian emergencies) and low income (poverty), low growth and food output 
per capita (stagnation and scarcity), the Gini coefficient (inequality), high inflation, high 
military expenditure and a history of conflict variable. These are the main variables that do 
seem to predispose – by correlation – a country to conflict. However, they also make it clear 
that together these variables only account for a small proportion of the variance observed in 
the data. Collier and Hoeffler (1996) also conduct econometric analysis in the hope of 
isolating variables that will predict civil war. Their results confirm the expectations of their 
underlying model. This model states that civil war is the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis 
conducted by would-be rebels against a government. Utility is maximised by starting a 
rebellion if the gains from victory outweigh the costs of coordinating a rebellion and the 
likelihood that the government will be able to sustain a massive military effort to contain or 
put down rebellion. These deciding factors are proxied by strictly economic measurements, 
except for the cost of coordination, which is measured by means of an index of ethnic 
fragmentation.  
 
While like most models of civil war this one finds that poverty is significant in the 
background to conflict, there are certain outstanding features of this model. In treating 
difference, via ethnicity, as a predictor of conflict, Collier and Hoeffler argue that a high 
degree of ethnic fragmentation, by raising coordination costs, is likely to represent a low risk 
of civil war in a country; on the other hand, a sharp polarisation, say between two ethnic 
groups, clearly predisposes a country to civil war. 11 The other treatment of difference, or 
relative deprivation, concerns the role that inequality plays in this model. Contrary to 
assumptions made in much of the literature on conflict in developing countries, Collier and 
Hoeffler propose that greater inequality reduces the risk of war. The reason for this does not 
lie in any social theory of differentiation and conflict, but in a public policy framework. 
Greater inequality indicates the presence of an elite that would allow the government to raise 
taxes on its income for a war effort that, if successful, would also preserve the status quo on 
which the elite thrives.  
 
A number of critical quibbles could be raised about this model and its empirical basis, 
not least the questionable presumption that armed conflict in developing countries begins with 
rebellion against the government. The simplicity of this assumption derives from a common 
idea that violence and conflict involve an aggressor and a victim, the two being more or less 
separate, rather than being tied together in a mutual and escalating process of violence. 
However, there are two particularly striking features of this approach worth highlighting here. 
The first is that the model is more explicitly than most built on the foundations of 
methodological individualism and rational choice that drive most mainstream economic 
analysis. The methodological implications of this are considered further below. The second is 
that the authors are resolutely unmoved by common traditional assumptions that conflict is a 
function of relative deprivation, grievance, or inequity. Instead, they propose that conflict is a 
function of the same basic human motivation that dominates mainstream economic notions of 
human behaviour, i.e. individual greed.  
 
                                                          
11 One of the more notorious outings for this ethno-linguistic fragmentation index is in Easterly and 
Levine (1997), where the ethno-linguistic variable, ETHN, is strongly correlated with public policy 
variables including the black market premium, poor financial development, poor infrastructure and low 
education, and combined with a small direct ethnicity effect, combined the ethnic-related variables 
account for half the difference in growth rates between Africa and East Asia. Besides a range of 
analytical problems with this model, it could be pointed out that among the nine Sub-Saharan African 
countries that count as monolingual on the judgement that 90 per cent plus of the population speaks one 
language, are countries typically associated with ethnically fuelled war – including Somalia, Burundi 
and Rwanda (McIlwham, 1998). 
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4.4 Economic agendas in the origins of conflict in Africa 
Indeed, there has been an increasing emphasis, in the recent literature, upon the 
leading role of economic factors in the origins of conflict – such as poverty and inequality – 
and also the role of economic motivations as the prime cause of war. This theme, however, 
has been treated in slightly different ways, not all necessarily relying so heavily on neo-
classical economics. There is a widespread argument that war in Africa has become 
increasingly apolitical (PRIO, 1999) and that politics, ideology, ethnicity, etc. have been 
replaced by straightforward power contests motivated chiefly by the pursuit of economic 
agendas. Some, such as Keen (1995), Duffield (1994) and Reno (1998), have stressed the role 
of civil war in enabling “asset transfers” and monopoly over mineral resources, as well as in 
enabling basic survival for many, but have done so within specific historical, political and 
socio-economic contexts. These tend analytically to focus on specific and shifting contexts of 
social relations between identity groups, political groups, and classes. From this perspective it 
is possible to assess why qualitative breaks occur in the historical record, i.e. why wars have 
broken out at a particular moment in certain countries.  
 
A related analysis is that of Collier (1999), which again ties the insight that there are 
economic factors involved in the origins of and motivations for conflict to a rigorous neo-
classical framework. Arguably, what this analysis gains in the elegance of its formal model it 
loses in social understanding. Collier states that wars in developing countries have become 
less ideological and are principally fuelled not by grievance but by greed, the root 
individualist assumption of all orthodox economics. This is contrary to arguments such as 
those of Wolf (1969) or Homer-Dixon (1991, 1995) that stress grievance arising from the mix 
of resource scarcity with social inequality and human rights abuses, but that argue that 
“violent struggles arise as much from perceptions of unfairness as from absolute shortages” 
(Messer et al, 1998: my emphasis).12 Collier’s finding is that “group grievances beneath 
which inter-group hatreds lurk, often traced back through history” (1999, 1) are not a good 
predictor of conflicts. Instead, economic agendas are important and economic opportunities 
are far more likely than social or group grievances to cause wars.  
 
The model designed to capture this distinction in motivation proxies economic 
agendas through measures of the share of primary commodities in GDP, the proportion of 
young men in the population, and the average years of education. Primary commodities signal 
economic opportunities chiefly because they are readily “lootable” or liable to predatory 
taxation. The more prevalent are young men in a society, the lower the cost of recruiting 
rebels. And this cost is lowered also if there are few peaceful income-earning opportunities 
for these young men, which may be captured by the educational attainment proxy. Grievances 
may be captured – similarly to Rodrik’s (1998) model of the effects of external shocks on 
growth in the presence of latent social conflicts – by indices of ethnic and religious 
fragmentation, inequality in land ownership, an index of political rights, and the rate of 
growth of per capita income. Collier’s statistical results suggest that some societies are much 
more prone to conflict “simply because they offer more inviting economic prospects for 
rebellion” (p.5). On the other hand, inequality does not matter at all, and political repression 
and a high degree of ethnic and religious fragmentation have the opposite to their predicted 
effects.  
 
Collier argues in support of his findings that since justice, revenge and relief from 
grievance are public goods, they are subject to free-rider problems that are a disincentive to 
rebellion. Further, people are unwilling to fight for a cause unless they are convinced that the 
rebellion will succeed, hence initially rebellions face a co-ordination problem. There is also a 
time-consistency problem in that potential recruits can recognise that a leader promising to 
                                                          
12 On perceptions of inequity as opposed to just objective measures of inequity see also Stewart (1998, 
28/29). 
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assuage grievances may, once in power, turn out not to deliver. Yet a greed-motivated 
rebellion, by restricting the benefits to the participants, avoids free-rider problems; by 
enabling the sporadic or territorially restricted predatory taxation of primary commodities, 
such rebellions avoid the need to assume final victory; and for the same reason, rebel recruits 
can be paid off from primary commodity rents instantly, so escaping the time-consistency 
problem (p.7). For good or ill, in this approach clearly the social is explained purely on the 
basis of market theory, explicitly in the case, for example, of free rider problems, and 
implicitly in the assumption that wars emerge from the aggregation of individuals’ rational 
utility maximising choices.  
There is little sense that conflicts may feed on both self-interest and concern for the 
public good at the same time, nor an acknowledgement that the complexity of cause and 
motivation cannot adequately be captured by the “grievance” variables, which, as empirically 
questionable measures of attributes of difference or stratification, are crude tools for capturing 
social relations in their diversity. Furthermore, as Keen (1998) suggests, some economic 
motivations for participating in conflict, and indeed for perpetuating conflict, may only 
become significant once a conflict has already begun rather than being the prior deciding 
factor in starting a rebellion. Nor is it easy to separate motivations or short-term interests that 
pull people together behind a programme of violence: money, food or clothing represents one 
form of interest, but is probably tied closely to coercion and fear (Stewart, 1998, 29). Further, 
in contrast both to Collier (1999) and to Reno (1998) and others, it can be argued that politics 
has not been abandoned by all concerned, even in the most extreme cases of apparent 
privatisation and depoliticisation of war. Atkinson (1996), for example, argues that it is 
necessary when analysing Liberia to distinguish between different time periods of conflict 
and also between different warring factions. Further, Atkinson suggests that for some groups, 
in particular Taylor’s NPFL, combined successful exploitation of war economy conditions 
with a genuine political agenda and pursuit of legitimacy. Indeed, not even the organisation of 
the war economy has been particularly different from pre-conflict informal and formal trading 
activities, in many cases. There is, therefore, a danger that the insight into economic 
motivations becomes too reductionist, and simply replaces one simplification – the tribal or 




4.5 Accommodating the social 
There is a tension in much of the literature between the rational and the irrational, or 
the rational and the social, centred on the role of ethnicity or, more broadly, collective 
identities. On the one hand, there is a notion that modern conflicts manifest in Africa pre-
modern, ancient ethnic rivalries – a view commonly held of the Tutsi-Hutu relationship in 
Rwanda, for example. On the other hand, ethnic differences are brought into “rationalist” 
economic models, typically on the assumption that ethnic fragmentation or polarisation is a 
structurally functional sign of animosity, rivalry, and weak social trust or social capital. For 
Stewart, for example, structural attributes of difference in a society do matter in the origin of 
conflicts, but less so the horizontal differences captured by measures such as the Gini 
coefficient, while more important are vertical inequalities such as religious or ethnic 
distinction (Stewart, 1998).13 The tension partly reveals a methodological problem. Most 
orthodox analysis of the political economy of conflict in Africa is based on methodological 
individualism, but at the same time assumes the significance of collective groupings such as 
ethnic identities, without fully working through the ways in which this might be incorporated 
into individualist rationality.14 To put this another way, most of the economic and political 
                                                          
13 The same idea has been put forward by the Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, as reported in 
Gourevitch (1999, 330). 
14 More generally, as Storey (1999, 43-44) argues, there is little consensus about the relationship 
between economic and ethnic factors. Horowitz (1998) argues that ethnic division of labour may, by 
reducing direct ethnic competition, work as a ‘shield’ against ethnic conflict rather than a ‘sword’ 
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economy literature suggests that war in Africa makes sense, but it is not clear exactly what 
form of rationality, or making sense, is at work. In some of these models, notably in Collier 
and Hoeffler (1996) and Collier (1999), the social – manifest in forms of collective identity – 
is introduced into the model but excluded from the underlying assumptions of the model, 
which are neo-classical and individualist. What emerges is a combination of neo-classical 
utility maximisation assumptions with social concepts, e.g. ethnicity, stripped altogether of 
their history and context. This analytical development is common to much recent orthodox 
work in economics, for example in the explosion of work on “social capital”, and is arguably 
a facet of the increasing colonisation by mainstream economics of the social sciences (Fine, 
1999a and b).  
 
Given the analytical and methodological tensions in this approach to the economics 
of conflict, future work may go down two different directions. One direction would be 
signposted by the asymmetric information paradigm that has guided much recent work on 
social capital, institutions and growth theory puzzles and that owes much to the work of 
Stiglitz (1994). If this route is taken then future work on the economics of conflict in Africa 
and elsewhere may show attempts to construct theories of ethnicity and collective identity that 
are derived from individual rationality in the presence of multiple information asymmetries 
and gaps. Arguably, work in this vein might also provide a means of investigating the 
aggregation of different kinds of motivation into an active military force. For one of the 
weaknesses of much of the literature on war in Africa is the lack of understanding of relations 
between those organising a rebel or state military effort and those, with highly variable 
degrees of “choice”, joining the war effort.  
 
The alternative direction for economic or political economy analysis of conflict 
would be to abandon analytical frameworks that begin with the individualist, non-social 
assumptions of neo-classical economics and that consequently consider the economic and the 
social as separable spheres. Instead, there could be greater commitment to the premise that 
economic relations, behaviour and performance are organically embedded in the social and 
the political.15 From this perspective, scarcity, poverty, and economic or environmental crisis 
are themselves to be understood as social events. In this vein, Messer et al (1998, 10-11) 
review succinctly a variety of resource conflicts embedded in ideological contests in different 
regions of the world. On the case-study level, Keen (1995), for example, argues against the 
economism of Sen’s entitlements approach to understanding famine and shows how power 
relations and war generated and exploited famine in Southern Sudan.16  
 
What the majority of mainstream economic analysis of conflict in Africa has in 
common is a functionalist framework. Given structural attributes of difference such as a 
particular ethno-linguistic index score, or a particularly high Gini coefficient, a propensity to 
conflict can be more or less read off, when combined with the effects of measures of 
institutional development and trends in economic performance variables such as GDP growth, 
terms of trade shocks, etc. Such an approach fits closely the work done in recent years that 
has tried to link the so-called new political economy with endogenous growth theory, 
generating cross-country sample-based arguments about the relationship between political 
                                                                                                                                                                      
sharpening such conflict. Others suggest that ethnic distinctions in the division of labour, e.g. the 
distribution of employment in the public and private sectors, may make a society vulnerable to conflict 
when a shock or policy change (such as privatisation) has sectorally differentiated consequences 
(‘Bayo Adekanye, 1995, in Storey, 1999; Mkandawire, 1994, 209-210).  
15 On the contrast between external and internal relations or between atomism and organicism in 
conceptions of the nature of social reality, see Lawson (1997, 166). According to external/atomistic 
concepts, reality consists of externally related entities so that all things exist and act in ways that are 
quite independent of any relationships in which they stand; while concept of internally or organically 
related social reality have in mind that the essential aspects of any particular entity can only be 
determined from a knowledge of the relationships in which it stands. 
16 See also Richards (1996) and Reno (1998) on Sierra Leone.  
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instability and growth (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1993) or income inequality and growth 
(Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). The most obvious problem with such an approach stems from the 
neglect of relations pertaining or evolving in specific historical contexts. Thus the descriptive 
measure of difference is taken to have causal powers irrespective of the actual social relations 
that generate and sustain such outward observations of difference. Ethnicity in Africa, for 
example, has very different social and historical meanings, and precise definitions of ethnic 
difference, with comparable value across the region, are elusive (McIlwham, 1998). 
Similarly, aside from the descriptive difficulties in measuring inequality precisely in Sub-
Saharan Africa, little in the literature has been influenced by Sen’s (1992) argument that a 
descriptive measure of a category like inequality can have very different social significance in 
different contexts. As a result, analyses stressing the role of such difference-attributes in the 
origin of conflict may pick up something, but only indirectly, and cannot, for example, 
account for where in a continuum of stratification difference begins to produce a qualitative 
break in terms of causal impact (Wood, 1995, 76). 
 
This approach, inferring the potential for war from functional attributes of difference 
or indicators of scarcity, is particularly suitable to cross-country comparison and the 
methodological predilection in economics for probabilistic prediction. However, this 
analytical framework suggests that wars in Africa, or in developing countries generally, have 
the same causes. Yet a cursory return to one of the themes of section 2 - the diversity of war 
experiences and types in Africa – suggests that it is not necessarily sensible to assume that we 
are comparing like events. As Tolstoy wrote: “The deeper we delve in search of these causes 
the more of them we discover, and each single cause or series of causes appears to us equally 
valid in itself, and equally false by its insignificance compared to the magnitude of the event” 
(quoted in Ehrenreich (1997, 4). 
 
 
4.6 Re-thinking violence and conflict 
It is possible that further research into the origins of violence and armed conflict in 
the region – and elsewhere – will open up new avenues of economic analysis suitable, 
perhaps, to methodologies less pinned down to the axioms of neo-classical economics. Here, 
rather than claiming a superior or complete theory of violence and war, it is worth at least 
introducing ideas that lead in a slightly different direction from the simple assumptions that 
scarcity and difference are functional generators of conflict. The work of Girard (1977, 1996) 
is particularly suggestive and, though based on the history of early societies and the role, 
particularly, of religion in containing violent relations between people within a society, it may 
have some bearing on studies of development and conflict. In particular, Girard challenges the 
conventional assumptions of violence rooted in deprivation and difference, as well as 
challenging the “myth of the individual” (in his case with reference to pyschoanalytical 
theory). Briefly, at the core of Girard’s work is the argument that the mimetic impulse, the 
need to copy a model other, is fundamental to human behaviour. This impulse leads to the 
need to own or appropriate those attributes and objects associated with the model, setting up 
an inherent potential for rivalry and conflict and generating complex reciprocal relations and 
the scope for mimetic escalation that can, of course, become violent (Girard, 1996). Conflict 
then arises not from the happenstance clash of two or more people with independent needs for 
a given object, but directly out of social relationships; and scarcity itself is then a product of 
the way that these relationships are framed. Social institutions – for example, religion or 
modern legal systems, and social hierarchical distinctions – work to contain the scope for 
violent conflict within this framework: partly by restricting the scope for appropriation and 
partly by displacement of violence, often onto scapegoating rituals that act as a legitimising 
vent for violence and a unifying institution.17 Ehrenreich (1997) complements this idea with 
                                                          
17 Girard argues that religions historically, through sacrifice, created a socially useful distinction 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ violence. While it is common to view mass human violence – such as the 
Nazi genocidal violence against Jews, or the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s – as a sign of a 
 19 
her argument that the social significance of war lies in the roots of human fears of predation, 
and in the historically entrenched ability of war or organised, legitimised violence to unite 
societies.  These ideas are efforts to acknowledge underlying tendencies that may commonly 
be at work in human societies, but they do not generate laws in the sense of predictable event-
regularities. Rather the degree and forms in which they emerge in observable outcomes will 
clearly vary with particular historical contexts and developments. A further point, in Girard, is 
that social differences and distinctions themselves do not inevitably produce violent conflict 
but that, to the contrary, the collapse of established differences, distinctions or hierarchies is a 
more common spur to violent conflict. Within Girard’s analytical framework this is because 
the erosion of differences releases the scope for uncontained mimetic rivalry and conflict. 
  
Translated to modern societies and the development literature, this may have some 
relevance. Mimesis is central nationally and internationally to Gerschenkron’s (1963) 
argument about the significance of lateness in industrialisation, since in late industrialisation 
there is a tension between the observable benefits of industrialisation and the obstacles to 
securing these benefits.  Mimesis is equally central to Anderson’s (1993) argument about how 
the nation-state became a model for political legitimacy internationally. Furthermore, Girard’s 
focus on the erasure of difference and not difference itself as producing violent conflict fits 
the observation that the spread of capitalist relations, and of social change generally, is 
associated with the breakdown of prevailing social structures and hierarchies and, indeed, 
with conflict.18 This is closer to the arguments reviewed above in the earlier development 
theory literature, suggesting that conflict may be integrally tied to the processes of capitalist 
development and their implications for social upheaval and change, whether or not that 
change is progressive.  
 
However unpalatable, and against the grain of late twentieth century notions of 
harmonious, inclusive development (Sen, 1997; Wolfensohn, 1999) and the idea that 
instability is bad for development, it may be that conflict commonly accompanies progressive 
change, that much that human societies hold dear, as Girard puts it, is founded in violence. 
His stress is on deeply repressed original violence in pre-modern societies. The most 
renowned version of this idea is Heraclitus’s remark that war is the father of all things. Most 
modern societies have emerged from violent conflict, too. The literature on convergence of 
growth rates, for example (Pritchett, 1997; Jones, 1997; UNCTAD, 1997), tends to start with 
data on the first industrialising nations from the 1870s and tends to neglect the precursor of 
conflict to such take-offs – e.g. the Prussian war and the process of German unification, and 
the American civil war. As Gourevitch notes (1999, 331), Yoweri Museveni is “a student of 
how the great democracies emerged from political turmoil, and he recognised that it did not 
happen quickly, or elegantly, or without staggering setbacks and agonising contradictions 
along the way…”. More recently still, countries that have, since 1950, managed rapid 
industrialisation combined with reasonably low economic inequality have been characterised 
by violent conflicts unleashed by the possibility of changing highly unequal social structures 
in South Korea, Taiwan and Greece, for example (Bowman, 1997).  
 
To put this another way, in contrast to institutional functionalism that presumes a 
given form of institution will work across all contexts, it could be argued that effective 
                                                                                                                                                                      
‘dysfunctional’ society, in some ways these forms of violence would not have been possible without 
their leaders’ succeeding in convincing the perpetrators or functionaries of mass murder that this was 
somehow ‘good’ violence. In both genocidal cases, there is an obvious element of unifying 
scapegoating, and it is significant that for Girard a good scapegoat combines the qualities of similarity 
to and difference from the core society for the violence against the scapegoat to be institutionally 
effective.  
18 Violent conflict can also offer a means of escaping prevailing hierarchies – for example, see Kriger 
(1992) on the way that joining the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was often an attractive means of 
escaping the oppressive stagnation and rule by elders in rural society, rather than some straightforward 
motivation of greed or the expectation of the gains from victory.  
 20 
conflict-management institutions are unlikely to emerge in any society without the experience 
of conflict of one kind or another.19 As Hirschman argues (1995), social conflict is inevitable, 
every change throws up new conflicts, and the mark of successful societies is their 
management of conflicts rather than the lack of them. Of course, conflict does not always 
generate progressive institutional and political developments, but it is equally clear that 
having a history of conflict does not inevitably consign a country to perpetual repetition of 
violence. Hirschman (1995) reviews the intellectual history – from Hesiod and Heraclitus 
through to twentieth century sociologists and political scientists – of the idea that conflict can 
have progressive social consequences. In particular, he stresses the argument that democracy 
(as one set of conflict-management or conflict tending institutions) does not appear from a 
prior universal acceptance of “basic norms” but often only after lengthy periods during which 
different groups have been at each others’ throats and eventually recognise that unilateral 
dominance cannot be secured by either. In Sub-Saharan Africa, if the recent history of Angola 
and Rwanda is one of face-off and the belief in total domination, there are nonetheless signs 
of this emergence of greater democracy from the experience of conflict. One example is 
Mozambique, where there was no democratic tradition but where parliamentary democracy 
has fared reasonably successfully since the end of war in 1992 and elections in 1994. 
Amongst the greatest challenges for further research into the political economy of conflict in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is this need to investigate the diverse experiences of institutional change 
in the wake of war. Now that the classical liberal interpretation of war – with its assumptions 
of war as exogenous and wholly negative in its socio-economic effects – has been overtaken 
by more nuanced analyses of the dynamics of wartime economies and societies, it may well 
be that this area of research will expand productively in coming years.  
 
 
4.7 Rwanda as a brief illustration 
Some of the ideas discussed above may be illustrated by the recent experiences of 
Rwanda. It is well known by now that in Rwanda the ethno-linguistic differences between 
Hutus and Tutsis are exceedingly difficult to pin down, even, ethnographically, non-existent 
(Austin, 1996; Gourevitch, 1999). At the same time, conventional economic measures of 
inequality suggest a society with a low Gini coefficient. The empirical facts of ethnically 
distinct advantages in access to education and public service employment do not support the 
idea that the Tutsi minority had unequal access to such opportunities (Storey, 1999). There 
were serious economic shocks in the late 1980s and early 1990s. World prices for Rwanda’s 
main export crops declined sharply, in particular for coffee (though this was offset partially 
by a 40 per cent increase in output). Structural adjustment policies in the 1990s included a 40 
per cent devaluation in November 1990 (Storey, 1999, 47). These shocks were serious but by 
themselves not probably more extreme than in many other economies, by no means all of 
which have slid into conflict. When the genocide did take place, it was far from a battle to 
overturn grand inequities: the vast amount of violence was conducted at the level of very 
slight, if any, material differences. Certainly, from the perspective of Collier (1999) some of 
the rent from genocide was collectable instantly in the form of occupying a neighbour’s land 
or home. However, it is questionable whether this economic outcome can be separated neatly 
from the ideology of grievance sustained by many Hutus. If the two can be analytically 
separated it is not clear that the economic outcome proves that economic motives – hived off 
from social and historical context – were prior to ideological influences and the power of 
authorities (and the fear that they induced). Even if the narrative of grievance that was 
propagated by the Hutu Power extremists was at some level the product of false 
consciousness, or a misleading narrative, as Collier suggests it typically is, most detailed 
research on Rwanda suggests that it was just as powerful as, if not more so than, economic 
motivations.  
 
                                                          
19 For a critique of functionalism in the new institutionalist economics, see Khan (1995) and, for 
example, on the difficulties in defining and measuring corruption, Khan (1999). 
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One of the crucial developments in the lead-up to the genocide was the civil war that 
began in 1990. It is not entirely clear that the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) force 
from Uganda was motivated purely by the expected material gains from victory or by the 
scope for predatory taxation during war of Rwanda’s main primary commodity exports 
(coffee, tin and tea). Indeed, some suggest (e.g. Austin, 1996) a different kind of cost-benefit 
calculation, by which the opportunity cost of not invading to return to Rwanda was raised 
sharply by political developments within Uganda after Museveni’s own military victory there 
(i.e. there was push as well as pull; c.f. Prunier, 1995). And this invasion was one of the 
factors in the slide towards the genocide of 1994. Arguably, a politically and historically 
developed ideology of difference had been the bedrock of Rwandan social relations for a long 
time, rooted in the myth of Tutsis’ Hamitic origins, formalised during Belgian colonialism, 
and reproduced in an inverted form by the Hutu Revolution of 1959, during and after which 
the violent expression of the disruption of established social distinctions became 
institutionalised. In some ways the pervasive ideology of exclusion obviously contained some 
possibility of instability, yet it was also a means of state-building, in which for the majority of 
the population one could argue that social capital was substantial. Certainly, the organisation 
of the genocide revealed an astonishingly effective degree of social and political cohesion 
among much of the population. The degree of organisation and social control of the genocide, 
and the top-down management from a core of Hutu Power extremists associated with the 
assassinated President Habyarimana’s widow through a network of district officials, would 
seem to confirm that this was a strongly political event rather than a purely greed-induced, 
individualist exercise in group murder.20 Commentators confirm a society in which 
conformity was of the utmost significance. Indeed, it is possible to read the Rwandan 
experience of the 1990s very much in terms of the collapse, or threatened collapse, of 
differences and a process of displacement and scapegoating.21 The major spurs to this threat 
of social change and the collapse of difference were the invasion from Uganda by the RPF, 
the Arusha peace agreement of 1993 that promised power-sharing, and the international 
pressure to “democratise”. Co-ordination of the genocide also involved a displacement of the 
economic failure of the Habyarimana regime to provide a way out of the economic pressures 
of high population density and primary commodity dependence.22 The Tutsi minority 
represented very well the qualities identified by Girard as characteristic of an ideal scapegoat: 
they were clearly similar to the Hutu majority ethnographically, but at the same time just as 
clearly defined as different through historical experience and the institutionalised myth of 
their Hamitic origins.  
 
A brief examination of the build-up to the Rwandan genocide suggests that the 
mainstream orthodox and liberal economic literature on war in Africa and other developing 
regions has only so far developed rough analytical tools. There remain conflicts in 
interpretation and analytical approach. The Rwandan case, like others, suggests considerable 
challenges for post-conflict economic policy design. It also suggests that there is a need for 




                                                          
20 The activities of the interahamwe Hutu Power extremists in “refugee” camps inside Zaire after 1994, 
and the evolution of conflict in Zaire/DRC since then, drawing in interests throughout much of Central, 
Eastern and Southern Africa adds further weight to the argument that formal politics is alive and well 
in the African conflicts of the 1990s.  
21 The term scapegoating is explicitly used in Uvin’s (1996) analysis of Rwanda. 
22 In Collier’s (1999) model, potential recruits to a rebellion are conveniently and speculatively 
endowed with rational expectations and a canny sense of the time-consistency problem. In the 
Rwandan case, it seems that many Hutus who joined in the genocide suspended their rational 
reservations – reservations that they might have been expected to sustain, given that the genocide was 
instigated by associates of the regime that had ruled, in their name, for decades since independence. 
Time consistency problems probably pall when one is confronted by coercion and fear.  
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5.  Conclusions and Policy Considerations 
 The literature on the economics and political economy of conflict in Africa has 
bloomed during the past decade. This literature has shown that the disciplines of economics 
and political economy are highly relevant to efforts to understand, respond to and even 
possibly prevent outbreaks of armed conflict that are debilitating in humanitarian and 
economic terms. There have been considerable advances, through this increase in activity, in 
our understanding of the ways in which conflict pervades an economy and society. There 
have been advances in our understanding of the differential experience of internal war, 
including the increasing focus on those who are the economic (and not just political) 
beneficiaries of conflict. This paper, however, has argued that there is not a consensus in the 
literature, and that there is a vital need for much more research and analytical work. There are 
two aspects to this need. Firstly, we still do not know nearly enough about the origins and 
dynamics of conflict and, even more important, about the diversity of conflict origins, 
experiences and effects across Sub-Saharan Africa. The single greatest need here is for further 
individual and comparative case-study research. Secondly, this paper has argued that the 
literature under review abounds with methodological tensions that are not sufficiently 
exposed and confronted. There is therefore a need for more work at the methodological level 
in terms of framing coherent analyses, generating alternative frameworks, etc. 
 
 The different methodologies, analytical assumptions and research emphases 
throughout the literature feed into the wide range of policy implications considered in the 
literature. Basically, what goes into a conflict analysis by way of assumptions and theory 
tends to come out the other end in policy implications. For example, Stewart (1998) is 
concerned to show that horizontal inequality is especially important in the cause of war and, 
as a result, recommends that the IMF and the World Bank pay more attention than they do to 
the implications of their reform programmes for horizontal inequality. In particular, she 
argues that IMF/World Bank programmes should not obsessively focus on cutting back state 
resources and spending, since these are a critical means of increasing horizontal equality. On 
the other hand, Collier (1999) builds on his assumptions about the nefarious effects of market 
distortions in providing benefits for wartime speculators and recommends that an effective 
way to prevent wars and in their aftermath to weaken the hand of those with a stake in 
perpetual conflict is to reduce monopoly profits, through market deregulation. More broadly, 
the literature is often divided between those that consider standard IMF/World Bank policy 
reforms theoretically sound and those that consider them fundamentally flawed and especially 
inappropriate to conflict-prone or post-conflict scenarios. Nonetheless, there are areas where 
analyses constructed on different assumptions generate more or less equivalent policy 
recommendations. For example, many conflict analyses focus on poverty or under-
development as a cause of conflict and therefore seek to prevent conflict by accelerating 
structural change and broad or inclusive economic growth. This would include diversification 
from traditional concentration on raw primary commodity exports. For those approaching the 
subject from a different angle, much the same conclusion might be made. Thus, for example, 
Collier (1999) argues that conflicts are especially associated with a high proportion of 
primary commodities in total exports and that, as a result, conflict prevention should include 
policies to advance diversification of exports.  
 
Most analyses distinguish in policy terms between:  
• policies aimed at prevention of conflict by tackling the “underlying causes” of conflicts,  
• policies reducing the vulnerability to conflict by avoiding pressure on potential “trigger” 
or “permissive” elements or policies,  
• policies focused on post-conflict recovery, including the methods for re-absorption of 
refugees and demobilised soldiers and the question of whether or not these should include 
“targeting” policies or more non-discriminatory, inclusive support programmes (Cramer 
and Weeks, 1997),  
• policies to reduce the individual incentives to lead or participate in a rebellion,  
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• and policies at the international level to provide political backbone to peace settlements, 
to reduce the resourcing of wars, or to reduce the scope for international aid to fuel 
conflict.  
 
One of the most common concerns of policy recommendations in this literature is the 
with the need for early-warning systems capable of increasing awareness of the potential for 
imminent conflict. There are difficulties here though. An early-warning system presumes 
understanding of the causes of conflict. To the extent that our knowledge of the causes of 
conflict remains fuzzy, such prediction systems may be rather unrefined and imperfect. 
Further, to the extent that the causes of conflict vary enormously, there is a danger in building 
international, institutionalised early-warning systems that have a tendency to favour a 
particular set of causes as more or less common to all conflicts. Further, there may be a 
danger of a “cry wolf” syndrome emerging: since, arguably, countries in internal conflict are 
not massively different from others but are exaggerated reflections of the tensions and social 
conflicts common to virtually all developing countries, characterised by late industrialisation 
and fragile “nation-ness”, then a conflict early-warning system might go off like an inner city 
car alarm, at the slightest rumble or whiff of wind. There is also an international governance 
or institutional issue here: for the tangle of prediction failure, standard external agendas and 
international politics that helped allow the Rwandan genocide to happen makes it clear that 
international sensitivity to the potential for conflict needs to be managed in as open and 
politically independent a manner as possible.23 Finally, there is a tension here that is more 
broadly relevant throughout the literature and its policy implications. This is the tension 
between the quest for generalised statements and quantitative event-regularities and the 
preference for what Luckham et al (1999) call more differentiated and contextual conflict 
analysis.  
 
 Most of the literature favours, for obvious reasons, fairly general political or 
institutional reforms to make Sub-Saharan African countries more democratic. For some, the 
emphasis needs to be on the role of external guarantors of peace settlements, to help entrench 
democratic compromise (e.g. Collier, 1999, or Boyce, 1997 on “peace conditionalities”). For 
others, it is important to recognise that representative majority democracy may not be the 
most effective institution for “inclusive” politics, and that varieties of proportional 
representation and power-sharing might be more effective in countries where the 
institutionalised exclusion or repression of minorities has been important to the origins of 
conflict (Stewart, 1998). Perhaps it could also be argued that international bodies should resist 
the temptation to foist their own preferred institutional settlement on a country, and instead 
should acknowledge that the most effective conflict-management institutions will be those 
that are designed precisely by parties that have been in conflict and that are relevant to the 
particular context.  
 
 The literature has focused to an increasing extent on the economic agendas that 
support or perpetuate conflict and on the way that conflict can become socially and 
institutionally entrenched. Consequently, there is considerable attention to policies that might 
help prevent this or bring it to a close. These policies range from rehabilitation of the 
judiciary, to power-sharing and pay-offs for demobilised soldiers, to the promotion of more 
competitive markets that offer less monopoly profit attraction to would-be warlords, and 
recommendations that international measures be taken to stop the flow of resources that fund 
war efforts, including diamonds (Angola and Sierra Leone), from illegitimate trading 
networks into the more centralised, legitimate networks. More awkwardly, there may be a 
need to accept that monopoly is not always developmentally unsound, and that the critical 
issue after a conflict, in which wartime accumulation via monopoly has taken place, is not 
necessarily to evaporate monopoly profits but to manage the state-private sector relationship 
so as to harness, in some cases, the socially progressive potential latent in monopolies.  
                                                          
23 See the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (1996).  
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 There are three points that may be made in brief to conclude this review. Firstly, for 
analytical and policy purposes, there is an urgent need for far more research, and research 
conducted through the application of various different methodologies, into the origins, 
dynamics and effects of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, it is important to focus 
on institutional change arising from social tension or conflict in Africa: research should 
explore this in the context of the management of conflicts before they become armed warfare 
as well as where there have been relatively successful transitions to peace and where there 
appear to have been failures of institutional development. Secondly, this paper has suggested 
that it is not just difference or differentiation per se that is significant in the build-up to 
conflict, but the particular economic and social relations underpinning outward attributes of 
difference and also the end or threatened end of a given social structure of differentiation. 
Many conflicts in Africa have been associated with the end of a social system that has opened 
up greater possibilities than existed before for what we have termed mimetic rivalry, with the 
potential for escalation into conflict. External pressure for democratisation in Rwanda, the 
looming possibility of the end of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique, and the 
end of a Cold War international legitimisation and funding of the regime in Liberia provide 
some examples. In each, international agencies are critically important. While the roots and 
pattern of conflict are intimately internal to social structures in Africa, it is therefore very 
important for the so-called international community to pay more attention to this aspect of the 
origins of conflict. Finally, again at the international level, helping to prevent wars in Africa 
may involve extraordinarily difficult political judgements, given the implications for virtually 
any aid programme for the balance of political and material interests in a country. These 
judgements should not be shirked, avoided partially in the rhetoric of even-handedness; 
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